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Recent research views the proliferation of citizenship-by-investment schemes primarily as a manifestation of the commodifi-
cation of citizenship by states succumbing to the logic of the market. I argue that these schemes exceed mere processes of
commodification. They are part of a neoliberal political economy of belonging. This political economy prompts states to in-
clude and exclude migrants according to their endowment of human, financial, economic, and emotional capital. I show how
the growing opportunities for wealthy and talented migrants to move across borders, the opening of humanitarian corridors
for particularly vulnerable refugees, and the hardening of borders for “ordinary” refugees and undocumented migrants all
stem from the same neoliberal rationality of government. In doing so, I challenge mainstream understandings of neoliberal-
ism as a process of commodification characterized by the “retreat of the state” and “domination of the market.” I approach
neoliberalism as a process of economization, which disseminates the model of the market to all spheres of human activity, even
where money is not at stake. Neoliberal economization turns states and individuals into entrepreneurial actors that attempt
to maximize their value, not just in economic and financial but also in moral and emotional terms. This process, I conclude,
undermines political notions of citizenship grounded in reciprocity, equality, and solidarity, not by replacing these principles
with economic ones but by rewriting these principles in economic terms.
Introduction
In October 2013, Malta amended its Citizenship Act to
include the possibility of purchasing Maltese citizenship
for a 650,000-euro fee. As of November 2016, Malta had
sold 477 passports (Micallef 2017). In the same period, it
granted refugee status to 600 non-EU citizens (UNHCR
2017), whereas more than 12,000 undocumented migrants
died in the attempt to cross the Mediterranean (IOM 2017).
While these figures illustrate a defining feature of the cur-
rent migration era—the selective openness and closure of
borders—scholars tend to deal with these phenomena sep-
arately. They treat the possibility of purchasing citizenship
through citizenship-by-investment programs mostly as a sign
of its commodification by states succumbing to the logic
of the market (Shachar and Hirschl 2014; Shachar and
Bauböck 2014; Carrera 2014; Dzankic 2012, 2015; Tanasoca
2016; Parker 2017). Conversely, scholars primarily analyze
(and challenge) the increasing reduction of mobility op-
portunities for undocumented migrants, refugees, and even
economically valuable migrants as a manifestation of secu-
rity logics and reassertion of state sovereignty (De Genova
and Peutz 2010; Brown 2010; Fassin 2011; Anderson 2014;
Jansen, Celikates, and Bloois 2015; Basaran 2015; Vaughan-
Williams 2015; Mavelli and Wilson 2017).
In this article, I argue that the opening of “global mo-
bility corridors for the ultra-rich” (Barbulescu 2014, 15)
and the hardening of borders for refugees, undocumented
immigrants, and economic migrants are manifestations of
Luca Mavelli is a Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at
the University of Kent, UK. His research focuses on biopolitics, neoliberalism,
migration, security, and secularism. He is the author of Europe’s Encounter with Is-
lam: The Secular and the Postsecular (Routledge, 2012) and the coeditor of Towards
a Postsecular International Politics: New Forms of Community, Identity, and Power (Pal-
grave, 2014) and The Refugee Crisis and Religion: Secularism, Security and Hospitality
in Question (Rowman and Littlefield, 2017). His latest articles have appeared in
the European Journal of International Relations, Review of International Studies, Security
Dialogue, Millennium, and Teaching in Higher Education.
Author’s note: I would like to thank the ISQ Editors, two anonymous reviewers,
Harmonie Toros, Jemima Repo, and Erin K. Wilson for their insightful comments
and suggestions.
the same neoliberal rationality of government that is rewriting
the meaning of belonging. Existing research on citizenship-
by-investment schemes fails to appreciate this connection
because it rests on an understanding of neoliberalism as a
process of “retreat of the state” and “domination of the mar-
ket.” It thus reduces the neoliberalization of citizenship to
its commodification, that is, to the possibility that citizen-
ship may be exchanged for money. Instead, I treat neoliber-
alism as a process of economization or marketization actively fos-
tered by the state. Neoliberal economization disseminates
the model of the market to all spheres of human activity.
It turns states and individuals into entrepreneurial actors
that attempt to maximize their value in economic and fi-
nancial terms (Foucault 2010, 242; Dardot and Laval 2013,
17; Brown 2015, 31).
Some research on the neoliberalization of citizenship
partially explores this transformation. It focuses on how
states have adopted a “market-mediated citizenship regime”
(Sparke 2006, 155) characterized by the “contractualization
of citizenship” in which “market value is the chief crite-
rion for membership” (Somers 2008, 22, 5; see also Ong
1999, 2006a, 2006b; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Brown
2015). This leads states to seek to attract “elite migrant
subjects,” namely, “wealth-bearing and talented foreigners”
(Ong 2006a, 501), which may advance the economic com-
petitiveness of the state (Brown 2015, 36). Building on and
advancing this literature, I argue that the market value of
migrants may not be confined to their capacity to boost
the economic growth of the country but also its emotional
welfare.
Hence, I maintain that the neoliberalization of citizen-
ship is contributing to the emergence of neoliberal forms
of belonging. These are not limited to the inclusion of “the
wealthy and the talented” and the exclusion of disenfran-
chised aliens but comprise other phenomena, such as the
opening of “humanitarian corridors” for particularly vulner-
able refugees. In the neoliberal political economy of be-
longing, inclusion and exclusion are increasingly becom-
ing a function of an individual’s, or a group’s, capacity to
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contribute to the country’s financial viability, economic
competitiveness, international reputation, moral standing
and self-understanding, and emotional well-being.
I therefore challenge the view that modern citizenship is
increasingly shaped by “universalizing [and contending] cri-
teria of neoliberalism and human rights” (Ong 2006a, 499).
I argue that human rights and humanitarianism should not
be considered independently from neoliberal rationalities
of government. The fact that “[i]n recent decades, health-
based claims have become an important part of citizenship
rights in the West” (Ong 2006a, 504) does not mean that
human rights and humanitarianism have acted as a bulwark
(however partial) against neoliberal logics. Rather, the fact
that a few thousand refugees are offered protection whereas
tens of thousands are left to die in the Mediterranean—and
along other migratory routes—or in overcrowded and dehu-
manizing camps is a function of their endowment of capital
value or lack thereof.
The discussion unfolds in three main steps. First, I ex-
plore the notion of neoliberalism as economization. I fo-
cus on its relevance for conceptualizing mutations in cit-
izenship and related patterns of inclusion and exclusion.
Second, I consider how the current debate on citizenship-
by-investment schemes, and its reliance on a “retreat of
the state” understanding of neoliberalism, encourages an
overly narrow focus on commodification. Third, I discuss
how these schemes are part of the broader neoliberal po-
litical economy of belonging that I sketched out above. In
the conclusion, I spell out some of the implications of my
argument for the present debate on neoliberalism and the
neoliberalization of citizenship.
Neoliberalism as the Economization of Individuals and
States
According to Dardot and Laval (2013, 7), dominant criti-
cal readings of neoliberalism are characterized by a funda-
mental “diagnostic error,” namely, interpreting it as an ideol-
ogy and economic policy that rests on an understanding “of
the market as a natural reality.” Marxist scholars reinforced
this “naturalist ontology” by interpreting neoliberalism as a
progressive “retreat” or “end of politics” and “domination
of the market” (Dardot and Laval 2013, 7, 11–16; Lemke
2003, 177). This view is well captured by the argument that
“where states were once the masters of markets, now it is
the markets which, on many crucial issues, are the masters
over the governments of states” (Strange 1996, 4). It con-
ceives of neoliberalism as an ideology, and related economic
policy, which shifts the balance of power between states and
markets, turns the state into a tool of ruling economic and
financial elites, and engenders “a process of general com-
modification of social relations” (Duménil and Lévy, quoted
in Dardot and Laval 2013, 13). This perspective is seminally
questioned by Michel Foucault in his 1978–79 lectures at the
Collège de France.
Building on, advancing, and eventually distancing him-
self from the work of scholars such as Karl Marx and Karl
Polanyi, Foucault (2010, 120–34, 242) argues that neoliber-
alism is more than a political ideology, an economic policy,
or a regime of governance. It is also a political rationality of
government based on the “economization” of state and so-
ciety. Neoliberalism applies the logic of the market—and,
particularly, the principle of competition—to all spheres
of human existence. For this reason, Foucault (2010, 120,
142–43) maintains, neoliberalism cannot be reduced to the
“retreat” of the state and commodification of all dimensions
of life. It entails a fundamental process of transformation of
all social units—namely, the construction of entrepreneurial
individuals, societies, and states—to make them fit for the
competitive neoliberal order. Hence, in neoliberalism the
market is not a natural entity that spontaneously emerges
from the “shrinking” of the state: it is a regime to be estab-
lished that requires an active intervention of the state or—as
Foucault (2010, 120–21) puts it—an “active governmental-
ity.”1
To better appreciate this argument, it is useful to briefly
elaborate on the difference between liberalism and ne-
oliberalism. Classical liberalism was based on the idea that
the market obeys “natural” and “spontaneous” mechanisms,
which transcend the capacity of governments to fully com-
prehend them. These mechanisms contribute to the simul-
taneous maximization of individual and collective value.
Adam Smith’s invisible hand—the idea that the interests
of society are best served by the pursuit of self-interest
by rational individual agents in a market free from state
intervention—is the paradigmatic illustration of this lib-
eral perspective (Foucault 2010, 278–79). For Foucault, this
idea promotes an important transformation in the meaning
and scope of sovereign power. Since the market is a self-
organizing entity capable of maximizing individual and col-
lective interests, sovereign power should not interfere with
its functioning (Foucault 2010, 28–29). Liberalism thus es-
tablishes a clear demarcation between the political sphere,
inhabited by homines politici concerned with rights and the
pursuit of the common good, and the economic sphere,
inhabited by homines oeconomici concerned with the pursuit
of their individual interest through “truck, barter and ex-
change” in the marketplace (Smith 1957 [1776], 12).
Neoliberalism undermines the liberal divide between pol-
itics and economics through two main avenues. First, it
pushes to an extreme the idea that market is the best mech-
anism to promote individual and collective growth and the
efficient allocation of goods and services. Therefore, it en-
courages the application of market mechanisms to other
spheres of human activity, such as politics, family, and ed-
ucation. Second, it advances the idea that the market is not
a natural and discrete environment based on dynamics of
exchange but an artificial and fragile system of relations
centered on logics of competition that requires constant po-
litical intervention to ensure its existence and functioning.
Hence, Foucault (2010, 121) maintains, in the neoliberal or-
der, “one must govern for the market, rather than because
of the market.”
For Foucault (2010, 110–20, 142–49; see also Cerny 2016,
7) existing neoliberal forms have their roots in the Ger-
man ordoliberal tradition. This school of thought, Dardot and
Laval (2013, ch3) explain, ascribes a fundamental role to
the state for the establishment and preservation of the ne-
oliberal order. It rests on a critical distinction between “eco-
nomic order” and “order of the economy,” in which the
latter—the active involvement of the state—is deemed es-
sential for achieving the former—the “economization” of
state and society (Dardot and Laval 2013, 87). This process
stands for the application of the logic of the market, and,
particularly, the principle of competition, to all spheres of
human existence.
As Philip Cerny (2016, 5–7) observes, in abstract terms the
ordoliberal idea that “markets do not arise spontaneously
1This view acknowledges that neoliberalism “is neither singular nor con-
stant in its discursive formulations, policy entailments and material practices” and
that therefore neoliberal logics of competition and entrepreneurship can flour-
ish in very different sociopolitical environments (Brown 2016, 4; see also Cerny
2016, 2).
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but are created and institutionalized by the state” challenges
the more famous “quasi-laissez faire version of [neoliber-
alism of] the Chicago School.” The latter, popularized by
scholars such as Milton Friedman and politicians like Mar-
garet Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Ronald Reagan
in the United States, advocates the “rolling back” of the
state in order to let the “spontaneous” order of the mar-
ket emerge. In practical terms, however, ordoliberal neoliber-
alism and laissez faire neoliberalism mutually support each
other (Cerny 2016, 9). Laissez faire neoliberalism consti-
tutes the ideological legitimation of an ordoliberal neolib-
eralism, which has seen the state crucially establishing, and
being transformed by, the neoliberal order (Cerny 2016, 10–
11).
This perspective challenges mainstream readings of ne-
oliberalism as deregulation and “rolling back of the state.”
It highlights how a “strong,” “interventionist,” and “en-
trepreneurial” state ensures the survival and thriving of
neoliberalism by promoting competition, attracting invest-
ment, dismantling labor protection, scaling down the wel-
fare state, privatizing public goods and services, saving the
market from its recurrent failures (Mavelli 2017a, 502–9),
and constructing subjects compliant with “neoliberal rea-
son” (Peck 2010, xi; Chandler and Reid 2016, 2). A central
implication of this neoliberal transformation is that invest-
ments, speculation, and risk are no longer confined to the
market (as a discreet environment) but become general ori-
entations of individuals and states alike. Neoliberalism can
thus be understood as a “principle of formalization” that en-
genders the “economization” of individuals, societies, and
states (Foucault 2010, 120, 242): the competitive logic of
the market becomes the all-encompassing framework of
meanings and significations that reshapes their sense and
purpose.
This neoliberal process of economization has two main
implications. First, homo oeconomicus—the entrepreneurial
self—is no longer confined to sphere of the market as in
classical liberalism but occupies all spheres of human exis-
tence. Neoliberalism marks the birth of individuals as cap-
ital (for themselves and for others), whose lives turn into
speculative enterprises aimed at maximizing their own cap-
ital value through logics of competition, accumulation, and
strategic positioning (Brown 2015, 17). Second, the state
progressively relinquishes its social and welfare functions
to turn into an “entrepreneurial” or “competition state.”
The latter’s primary concern is “maintaining and promot-
ing competitiveness in a world marketplace” and “ensuring
that citizens keep up with the multiple pressures and de-
mands of that increasingly integrated and interdependent
political, economical and social ecosystem” (Cerny 2010, 6).
These two processes are mutually reinforcing. Neolib-
eral entrepreneurial subjects increasingly perceive them-
selves as human capital to be invested in education,
training, professional development, networking, partner-
ing, self-promotion, showcasing, traveling, and social and
personal relationships to improve their status, wealth, well-
being, strategic opportunities, career options, employabil-
ity and marketability. According to Wendy Brown (2016, 9),
thinking of and acting over oneself as capital to be invested
in order to enhance the capital value of the country is a so-
cial imperative. It is also an essential requirement of a citi-
zenship turned “sacrificial,” namely, citizens are increasingly
expected to sacrifice themselves for the health and wealth
of the nation. Citizenship thus becomes “wholly conditional
upon the ability to exchange something of sufficient mar-
ket value” (Somers 2011, 26). That is, it becomes a function
of the neoliberal political economy of belonging: a political
rationality of government that enthrones the market as the
fundamental and essential measure of the value and worth
of citizenship.
Hence, when it comes to the rationalities of inclusion and
exclusion of migrants, the entrepreneurial state emerging
from the process of economization will approach prospec-
tive as well as current citizens as “living resources that may
be managed and harnessed” for economic purposes (Ong
2006b, 6). Neoliberal economized states will include “indi-
viduals who possess human capital or expertise [that] are
highly valued” and exclude those “who are judged not to
have such tradable competence or potential” (Ong 2006b,
7). For Ong (2006b, 15), these rationalities of inclusion and
exclusion are part of a neoliberal transformation in which
citizenship is no longer the inescapable condition of possi-
bility for the “the right to have rights” (as Hannah Arendt
famously put it). This certainly continues to be the case “for
asylum seekers and refugees, for whom gaining citizenship
in a host country is the most basic step towards being recog-
nized as modern human beings” (Ong 2006b, 15). However,
it no longer applies to a cosmopolitan elite of wealthy, edu-
cated, and entrepreneurial individuals:
Expatriate talents constitute a form of movable enti-
tlement [with or] without formal citizenship. Citizens
who are deemed too complacent or lacking in neolib-
eral potential may be treated as less-worthy subjects.
Low-skilled citizens and migrants. . . are constructed
as excludable populations in transit, shuttled in and
out of zones of growth. . . . [C]ertain rights and ben-
efits are distributed to the bearers of marketable tal-
ents and denied to those who are judged to lack such
capacity or potential. (Ong 2006b, 16)
According to Ong, however, the neoliberal transforma-
tion of citizenship should not be considered as an unchal-
lenged totalizing rationality. Several regimes of “exception”
variously grounded in “religion . . ., feminism, humanitar-
ianism and other schemes of virtue” articulate contending
views of citizenship through what she describes as, drawing
on Collier and Lakoff, a “counterpolitics of sheer life” (Ong
2006b, 22–24). These schemes deploy forms of protection
in the name of a shared humanity and global solidarity. This
“counterpolitics” is for Ong an important source of entitle-
ment for citizenship and citizenship-like rights. It constitutes
a relevant exception and challenge to neoliberal schemes of
valuation and modes of belonging.
Ong’s argument that neoliberalism should not be con-
sidered as the only rationality that shapes citizenship and
the politics of belonging is certainly relevant. However, it
crucially overlooks how forms of inclusion based on hu-
man rights, shared humanity, and common solidarity may
be economized. That is, these schemes of virtue may be col-
onized and corrupted by neoliberalism. Hence, what I am
suggesting is that modes of inclusion seemingly based on
human rights and shared solidarities may be the expression
of neoliberal rationalities that value prospective citizens for
their embodiment not just of economic or financial capital
but also of moral or emotional capital.
To appreciate this argument, it is necessary to return
to the concept of “economization,” particularly in the for-
mulation advanced by Wendy Brown. For Brown (2015,
31, emphasis added), economization stands for the process
whereby “neoliberal rationality disseminates the model of the
market to all domains and activities—even where money is not
an issue.” Economization, she emphasizes, differs from mon-
etization. The fact that all spheres of life become informed
by the logic of the market means that individuals and states
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alike will act according to logics of competition, strategic po-
sitioning, and maximization of value even in those instances
when money may not directly or only indirectly be at stake.
For instance, Brown (2016, 31) considers how dat-
ing through online dating companies is increasingly ap-
proached as an investment which entails targeting the right
person through a careful process of evaluation and screen-
ing to maximize “return on investment of affect.” The pur-
pose of dating thus becomes generating an emotional re-
turn. Similarly, a Facebook user may publish pictures or post
comments not primarily to share their life experiences but
to accumulate “likes” to improve their social ranking and
benchmarking.2 Equally, the Twitter “hashtag activist” may
carry out their digital protest as a means of self-promotion.
These are all instances of economization (of mating and so-
cialization) in which entrepreneurial subjects enact strate-
gies of capital enhancement that are not directly measurable
in terms of monetization or economic growth.
In other cases, the economization of “heretofore noneco-
nomic domains, activities” such as higher education and
charitable work may still take place, even if the possibility of
a monetary gain is at best an indirect and probabilistic one
(Brown 2015, 31). Thus, in neoliberal academia, university
students are increasingly approaching knowledge not as a
journey of discovery or a process of transformation of the
self but as a purely instrumental endeavor, which may bring
a better social status and salary in the future (Mavelli 2014,
864). Likewise, charitable volunteer work may provide an
opportunity for strengthening one’s curriculum vitae, gain-
ing social approval, and improving one’s chances of employ-
ability, rather than the possibility to genuinely connect with
and help others (Brown 2015, 31).
According to Brown (2015, 10), the neoliberal ratio-
nalities that inform entrepreneurial subjects—namely, “im-
proving and leveraging” their “competitive positioning and
. . . enhancing [their] . . . monetary and nonmonetary
portfolio value across all . . . endeavors and venues”—are
also “the mandates, and hence the orientations, contouring
the projects of neoliberalized states.” However, despite this
homology between entrepreneurial individuals and states,
Brown ultimately provides a rather “conventional” account
of the neoliberal state as fundamentally concerned with
economic growth. In line with economic theorists of the
“competition state” (see, for instance, Cerny 1997, 2010;
Fougner 2006), she focuses on how the state progressively
relinquished or significantly scaled down its welfare func-
tions and turned into what Cerny (quoted in Fougner 2006,
167) describes as “a market player, that shapes its policies to
promote, control, and maximize returns frommarket forces
in an international setting.”
This highlights an important limit of existing scholarship
on the neoliberalization of citizenship. Such scholarship
ignores how neoliberal economization may prompt states
to behave like entrepreneurial subjects trying to maximize
not just their economic growth but their nonmonetary and
noneconomic capital value. States may approach prospec-
tive or existing citizens as capital that may enhance not just
their economy but their cultural, emotional, and reputa-
tional value.
The argument advanced in this section suggests three
main considerations, which will be further explored in the
next two sections. First, states’ endeavors to attract talented
and wealthy individuals—including through citizenship-by-
investment schemes, as I shall discuss in the next section—
2As effectively portrayed in the not-so-alternative reality of the episode “Nose-
dive” of the television series “Black Mirror” (21 October 2016).
should not be primarily understood as a product of the
retreat of the state and domination of the market, which
turns citizenship into a saleable commodity. Rather, these
endeavors should be considered as the expression of en-
trepreneurial states. They treat the granting of citizenship as
an investment aimed at attracting wealthy and talented indi-
viduals in order to strengthen their economic and financial
competitiveness.
Second, the fact that entrepreneurial states increasingly
approach existing and prospective members as “living re-
sources that may be managed and harnessed” for economic
purposes (Ong 2006b, 6) suggests that membership in a
political community is no longer solely a function of one’s
own legal status (citizen, resident, refugee, asylum seeker,
etc.) but of one’s own endowment of human, economic,
and financial capital. This means that, as I shall discuss in
the next section, neoliberalism is progressively blurring the
boundary between citizens and residents. The result is that
citizenship may no longer be the necessary and sufficient
condition for “the right to have rights” and that wealthy res-
idents may have more rights than citizens lacking in human
or economic capital.
Third, the neoliberal process of economization indicates
that states will strive to maximize their capital value not just
in economic and financial terms but also in emotional and
reputational terms, that is, even in those areas in which
money is not at stake. It follows that states may approach
prospective and existing citizens not just as human, eco-
nomic, and financial capital, but also as a source of emo-
tional, moral, and reputational value. Hence, as I shall
discuss in the third section, neoliberalism does not simply
undermine the principles of reciprocity, fairness, equality,
mutual participation, and solidarity that should inform po-
litical forms of citizenship by replacing these principles with
economic ones. Rather, neoliberalism rewrites these princi-
ples in economic terms.3
Citizenship for Sale and the Limits of the
Commodification Argument
In October 2013, Malta’s decision sell 1800 passports—
hence, Maltese and European citizenship—for a 650,000
euro fee prompted a heated European debate on “citizen-
ship for sale.” In a 2014 speech at the European Parliament,
then vice-president of the European Commission Viviane
Reding (2014) stated that the Maltese sale of citizenship
threatens to undermine the very notion of belonging to the
EU, which should be based on “personal ties” rather than
“on the size of someone’s wallet or bank account.” For this
reason, Reding (2014) maintained, citizenship should not
be treated as a “tradable commodity” with “a price tag on
it.”4 Following the protests of the European Union, Malta
introduced a minimum (albeit, extremely loose) residency
3This argument differs from theMarxist critique that principles of reciprocity,
fairness, equality, mutual participation, and solidarity are ultimately the expres-
sion of an overly idealized and romantic idea of citizenship, which is strategically
deployed by the bourgeoisie to serve its interests (see Bauder 2014, 320). My fo-
cus is not on how these principles may be the instantiation of a “false conscious-
ness” produced by states that have been “captured” by the ruling economic and
financial elites but how these principles have been “economized,” that is, shaped
from within by economic rationalities. On the distinction between “captured” and
“economized” states, see Mavelli 2017a, 494–95.
4Similarly, in November 2015, United States Senator Dianne Feinstein
(CIS 2015) stated that the EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program—a residency-by-
investment program that requires an investment of at least 500,000 US dollars
and the creation or preservation of “10 permanent full-time jobs for qualified
U.S. workers” —is akin to commodifying citizenship as it puts investors “and their
direct family on a special path” that is denied to ordinary migrants. According
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requirement in order to satisfy the principles of genuine
connections and personal ties with the country. It also raised
the total amount of the investment needed by requiring the
purchase of property worth 350,000 euro and an investment
in government bonds or shares of 150,000 euro. These mea-
sures, however, did not change most commentators’ view
that Malta is de facto selling its citizenship.
Malta is not the first European country to introduce
a citizenship-by-investment scheme. In May 2013, Cyprus
launched its investor citizenship program with two main
goals: boosting the country’s business environments and
compensating those foreign investors who lost millions as a
result of the March 2013 bailout (Dzankic 2015, 8–10). The
latter imposed a bank deposit levy on uninsured deposits
of over 100,000 euro, most of which were held by foreign
citizens (primarily Russians) due to Cyprus’ status as a tax
haven. Cyprus’ scheme offers citizenship for an individual
investment of 5 million euro or for an individual investment
of 2.5 million euro if part of a collective investment of at
least 12.5 million euro (Cypriot Ministry of Interior 2016;
see also Dzankic 2015, 8–10). It also allows foreign investors
who incurred losses of at least 3 million euro as result of
the bailout deal to detract the amount of their loss from
the investment. As a citizenship planning firm in charge of
marketing the scheme advertises, a financial investment and
ninety days will grant “a Cypriot passport and EU citizen-
ship, allowing the freedom to work, travel, study and live
anywhere within the EU,” all of which makes Cyprus’ pro-
gram rank “top in terms of Quality of Life, Visa Free Access,
[and] Processing Time” (Henley and Partners 2016).
Bulgaria and Romania also recently introduced
citizenship-by-investment schemes. The former stipulates
that in order to be eligible for citizenship by investment,
the successful candidate needs to have already been a
permanent resident for at least a year (no language and
culture requirements) (InvestBulgaria 2016). In the case
of Romania, the permanent residency requirement is at
least four years and the applicant needs to be able to show
proficiency in language and knowledge of the culture of the
country (Migrant in Romania 2016; see also Dzankic 2015,
12–13). The residency-by-investment programs offered by
several other countries, including France, Portugal, the
United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States, grant
residency for a financial investment (purchase of govern-
ment bonds, shares, or loan capital), purchase of property,
transfer of capital, or establishment of a business that results
in the creation of new jobs. Countries vary greatly in terms
of the amounts needed, combination of requirements, and
length of the investment. Nonetheless, the general feature
of these programs is that although they do not waive all
traditional citizenship requirements, they often reduce
some of them and allow for more expedited procedures.
They thus constitute privileged and facilitated routes for
obtaining citizenship.
According to Ayelet Shachar and Ran Hirschl, these de-
velopments represent, to varying degrees, a vivid instan-
tiation of an ongoing process of commodification. These
“cash-for-passports” programs, they argue, are “the sale and
barter of membership goods in exchange for . . . a large
stack of cash” and the product of “[r]apid processes of mar-
ket expansionism” that “have now reached what for many
is the most sacrosanct non-market good: membership in
a political community” (Shachar and Hirschl 2014, 234).
This view is shared by several scholars. Peter Spiro (2014, 9)
to Feinstein (CIS 2015), this program sends the wrong message as “[i]t says that
American citizenship is for sale, and that’s not what our country stands for.”
maintains that “[t]he emerging market for citizenship liter-
ally commodifies the status” and is “a manifestation of cit-
izenship that is already being hollowed out.” David Owen
(2014, 31) argues that these programs are “blatant examples
of the commodification of citizenship.” For Jelena Dzankic
(2014, 18), they are turning citizenship into “a tradable
commodity . . . voiding it of the sense of rights and duties
and undermining citizens’ solidarity.” For Rainer Bauböck
(2014b, 19), the transformation of citizenship “into a global
commodity” is turning citizens from “stakeholders” with po-
litical, social, moral and affective interests in the political
community into “stockholders.” These are citizen-investors,
whose interest in the polity is purely instrumental, that
is, linked to “the mobility rights attached to passports”
(Bauböck 2014a, 1) and the economic or financial benefit
that may come from it (Magni-Berton 2014, 11).
Hence, these scholars tend to converge on the idea that
citizenship-by-investment schemes are the expression of a
process of retreat of the state and domination of the market
that is resulting in the commodification of citizenship. They
argue that citizenship should be about political relations
and participation, equality, commitment and mutual soli-
darity, and daily engagement in the public sphere (Shachar
2014, 5; Bauböck 2014b, 19; Ochoa 2014, 24). Conversely,
citizenship for sale is purely about economic calculation,
individual management of risk, and strategization of one’s
own life opportunities. Citizenship-by-investment schemes
are thus shifting citizenship from the political domain of the
state to the economic logic of the market. As Rainer Bauböck
(2014b, 20) summarizes, “[t]urning the status of citizenship
itself into a marketable commodity” undermines political
and social commitments, “corrupts democracy,” and risks
“tear[ing] down a wall of protection that keeps social class
from becoming, once again, a formal marker of inequality
of citizenship rights and status.”
In the remaining of this section, I shall consider two
main limitation of this analysis in light of the argument ad-
vanced in the previous section. First, existing scholarship
tends to portray states uniquely as victims of rampant ne-
oliberal globalization. Hence, it largely neglects the extent
to which entrepreneurial states have long competed against
each other to attract “valued forms of [human] capital . . .
[w]hether it is inducements to foreign millionaires . . . or
to skilled workers in medical, finance or IT sectors” (Owen
2014, 31). Several scholars, however, object that there is
a substantial difference between “[p]lacing a price tag”
on citizenship as citizenship-by-investment schemes do and
“selectively focusing on the extraordinary talent and track
record of those entering the country through designated
skills-based, talent-for-citizenship exchanges” (Shachar and
Hirschl 2014, 234; see also Parker 2017, 345). Whereas the
former represent a blatant instantiation of commodification
of citizenship, the attempt to attract valuable forms of hu-
man capital—whether through immigration point systems
or discretionary naturalization5—concerns a political deci-
sion about the meaning, identity, and composition of the
community (Shachar and Hirschl 2014, 234–35).
This perspective, I contend, rests on an untenable dis-
tinction between capital and human capital. Consider the
case of German-born United States billionaire Peter Thiel,
the cofounder of Paypal, who was granted New Zealand cit-
izenship in 2011. This news surfaced in January 2017 and
5Discretionary naturalization is the prerogative of most nation-states of discre-
tionarily granting citizenship on the basis of national interest to individuals who
have provided or may provide an exceptional contribution to the country in the
fields of science, arts, sport, economy, culture, media, public service, and, more
generally, to those who have contributed to advancing its international status.
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sparked controversy because Thiel did not meet the require-
ment for citizenship: he was not born in New Zealand, had
not spent 70 percent of the previous five years in the coun-
try (only visited it six times for short periods), and had not
been granted refugee status. While New Zealand does not
have a citizenship-by-investment scheme, its Citizenship Act
includes the provision that “the Minister may authorize the
grant of New Zealand citizenship to any person . . . if . . .
[deemed] in the public interest because of exceptional cir-
cumstances of a humanitarian or other nature relating to
the applicant” (New Zealand Citizenship Act 1977).
As the 145-page file on his citizenship application ex-
plains, Thiel was granted citizenship because of “excep-
tional circumstances” related to “his skills as an en-
trepreneur and his philanthropy,” which included having
donated NZ$1m to the Christchurch earthquake relief fund,
being involved in a series of business ventures in the country,
and being committed to “contribut[ing] to the existing en-
trepreneurial environment and further development of the
venture capital market in New Zealand” (Ainge Roy 2017).
These factors, the document concludes, make Thiel’s citi-
zenship potentially beneficial for New Zealand.
This case cannot be grasped by a perspective that draws a
sharp distinction between schemes designed to attract cap-
ital and schemes designed to attract human capital, and
that reduces the former to the “prostitution” of citizenship
(Parker 2017, 345). Thiel was capable of “buying” his way
into the country through a “generous donation” even in the
absence of a citizenship-by-investment scheme. Nonethe-
less, his contribution could not be reduced to just one of
“cash,” given that he had a series of business ventures in New
Zealand (which had contributed to create jobs). Yet, these
investments pre-dated the granting of citizenship, which
was therefore not strictly necessary for the country to be
able to benefit from his investments. This case shows how
citizenship-by-investment programs are only one manifesta-
tion of a process of neoliberalization of citizenship that tran-
scends mere commodification and prompts entrepreneurial
states to evaluate and include or excludemigrants according
to their capital endowments.
From this perspective, the governmental rationalities be-
hind Thiel’s citizenship are the same ones behind Malta’s
and Cyprus’ citizenship-by-investment schemes. These ratio-
nalities also inform “talent for citizenship” schemes, such as
the recent initiative of the Wellington Regional Economic
Development Agency (WREDA). This agency launched
a call for the “the best and the brightest” from across
the world to fill one hundred high-qualified tech jobs in
Wellington, New Zealand, and encouraged them to settle “in
a place with a lifestyle you never thought possible” (WREDA
2017). In all of these cases, entrepreneurial states compete
against each other in order to attract the wealthiest and
brightest in exchange for citizenship, business opportuni-
ties, or the promise of an outstanding lifestyle.
Undoubtedly, these schemes encompass an underlying
logic of commodification. Yet, the above cases show that
commodification takes place even if citizenship and resi-
dency are not traded for cash. Hence, contra what many
scholars of “citizenship for sale” explicitly or implicitly sug-
gest, commodification is not exclusive to cash-for-passports
programs. Hence, these initiatives cannot be reduced to
mere processes of commodification in which states are
succumbing to the power of market. What is at stake is
a more complex phenomenon in which entrepreneurial
states—initiators and expression of a neoliberal process of
economization—are redesigning the meaning and implica-
tion of citizenship and belonging in neoliberal terms.
This leads us to the second main limitation of existing
scholarship. Its narrow focus on commodification makes it
unable to grasp how citizenship-by-investment schemes are
part of a broader neoliberal process that is undermining
citizenship not just from within but from without. Current
scholarship considers how these schemes “corrupt democ-
racy” and foster inequality by undermining the principle
of equality at the heart of citizenship. Yet, it neglects how
the very same process takes place even in the absence of
citizenship-by-investment schemes. In particular, existent ac-
counts ignore how the race to attract the wealthiest and
brightest is blurring the divide between “citizens” and “resi-
dents” to the effect that “wealthy” residents may be granted
more rights than citizens lacking in human or economic
capital.
The United Kingdom offers an interesting illustra-
tion of this argument. Despite lacking a citizenship-by-
investment program, it has long acted as a magnet for the
world’s wealthiest. Currently, there are almost ten thousand
UHNWIs in the United Kingdom (ultra high-net-worth indi-
viduals whose individual assets exceed US$30 million), a sig-
nificant proportion of which is constituted by Russian, Chi-
nese, and Middle Eastern billionaires (Knight Frank Wealth
Report 2017). Worldwide, London is the city with the high-
est number of UHNWIs (4,750) and the second highest
number of HNWIs (370,000; these are individuals with fi-
nancial assets of at least US$1m) (Knight Frank Wealth
Report 2017).
What makes the United Kingdom the most attrac-
tive destination for UHNWIs in Europe and one of the
most attractive in the world is a combination of politi-
cal stability, limited taxation on wealth, and flexible la-
bor market. Most of the country’s foreigner UHNWIs and
HNWIs benefited from the Tier 1 Investor Visa. This is a
residency-by-investment program that enables those who in-
vest “£2,000,000 or more in UK government bonds, share
capital or loan capital in active and trading UK registered
companies” to apply for temporary residency first, and then
for permanent residency after three years for an investment
of £5 million, or after two years for an investment of £10
million (GOV.UK 2016).
This scheme allows wealthy foreigners to bring their
spouse. This possibility is currently denied to British citi-
zens who earn less than £18,600 a year and are married to
non-EU citizens. This norm, which endows wealthy foreign-
ers with more rights than British citizens, is estimated to af-
fect thousands of families, including 15,000 children who
are denied the possibility to live with both parents (Travis
2017). It was introduced in 2012 to lessen the possibility that
social welfare benefits may be claimed, as part of a wider
strategy of the Conservative government to “reduce net mi-
gration from the hundreds of thousands to the tens of thou-
sands” a year, as then home secretary and current prime
minister Theresa May stated in 2010 (May 2010). Its mes-
sage is clear: those “who contribute wealth” to the United
Kingdom “are welcome”; those “who come to the country
and consume [its] wealth” are not (Britain International
Trade Secretary Liam Fox, cited in Stone 2016), irrespective
of whether or not they are British citizens.
At a first reading, this case may suggest that what matters
in the neoliberal political economy of belonging is the eco-
nomic value of citizens and residents. However, the case is
more complex. Eleonore Kofman and Helena Wray (2013,
1) show that the cost-benefit calculations of the government
that prompted the £18,600 minimum income requirement
for family reunifications failed to take into account that “sin-
gle people are more likely to claim benefits than those living
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isq/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isq/sqy004/4996972
by University of Kent user
on 24 May 2018
LUCA MAVELL I 7
with a partner.” The government also neglected “the ad-
vice of the Migration Advisory Committee” by considering
only “the cost of services to migrants but not their overall
economic contribution” (Kofman and Wray 2013, 1). The
result is that “the Government overestimated the negative
impact of migrants,” with the effect that this policy, rather
than contributing to British wealth, may cost up to £850 mil-
lion over ten years (Kofman and Wray 2013, 1). This argu-
ment suggests that this policy may be primarily motivated
by the desire to bring immigration numbers down, rather
than by sound economic calculations. Differently said, this
norm seems to entail an evaluation of non-EU spouses more
in terms of their political and emotional impact than potential
cost-benefit contribution.
The arguments advanced in this section suggest two
provisional conclusions. First, citizenship- and residency-
by-investment programs should not be understood solely
as the instantiation of a process of neoliberal commodifi-
cation. They are part of a broader transformation of cit-
izenship along neoliberal lines that blurs the divide be-
tween “citizens” and “residents.” The result is that “wealthy”
and “talented” residents may be granted more rights than
citizens “lacking” in human or economic capital. Second,
neoliberal political rationalities of government may in-
creasingly prompt states to evaluate and include or ex-
clude migrants according to their endowment of economic,
financial, cultural, and—crucially—emotional capital (as
Britain’s £18,600 minimum income requirement for family
reunifications suggests).
This latter argument will be further explored in the next
section. Through a series of empirical illustrations, I will
show how neoliberalism encompasses a process of econo-
mization that prompts individuals and states to maximize
their capital value even in those areas where money is not
directly at stake and even if this may imply an economic cost.
The Neoliberal Political Economy of Belonging
In February 2016, Dimitri Leemans, a Belgian mathematics
professor at the University of Auckland, had his thirteen-
year-old stepson denied residency on the grounds that he
was autistic and would have constituted an unduly heavy
burden for New Zealand’s welfare system. Immigration New
Zealand (cited in Ainge Roy 2016) explained that “[a]ll mi-
grants are required to have an acceptable standard of health
so as not to impose undue costs and/or demands on New
Zealand’s health and/or special education services.” The
professor, winner of several national awards, received nu-
merous statements of support and solidarity from his peers.
They are worth quoting in full:
Astrid an Huef, president of the New Zealand Mathe-
matics Society, said the departure of “an outstanding
mathematician” like Leemans would be “a great loss
for us and New Zealand.” “The New Zealand math-
ematics community deeply regrets that we are losing
our valued and talented colleague, Dimitri Leemans,
under such sad circumstances. We have benefited
greatly from his research expertise and teaching ex-
cellence.” University of Auckland vice-chancellor Stu-
art McCutcheon said Leemans was “an example of the
outstanding young academics wemust have at the Uni-
versity of Auckland if we are to maintain our premier
world ranking.” (Ainge Roy 2016)
What emerges from these statements is not solidarity with
the professor and his stepson for the fact that a child was de-
nied the right to stay due to a physical condition. It is not
solidarity in the name of compassion, justice, universal dig-
nity, shared humanity, and the right to emigrate for people
with disabilities. It is not solidarity against the accounting
logic that objectifies individuals as a bundle of costs and
benefits and excludes those who are considered a burden
to the health and education system. Solidarity was in the
name of the fact that New Zealand was losing a “valued
and talented colleague,” an “outstanding young academic”
who had contributed to the international competitiveness
of the university and of the country. Solidarity was primarily
grounded in a neoliberal economic rationality that has as its
primary concern the “value” of the academic as a measure
of his contribution to the value, competitiveness, and rank-
ing of the university and the country. It was in the name of
the fact that New Zealand was losing valuable human cap-
ital that would negatively affect its “growth.” Solidarity was
completely “economized.”
This case may suggest that, in the neoliberal political
economy of belonging, people with illnesses and disabilities
will always be considered a burden and be excluded. After
all, according to Nobel laureate Gary Becker (2011, 27), a
pioneer in the study of human capital and behavior through
an economic lens, the list of people that should be denied
the right to immigrate include “obvious cases such as poten-
tial terrorists, criminals and people who are very sick and
who would be immediately a big burden to the health sys-
tem.” These groups have negative human capital attributes,
which make them potential threats to economic growth.
However, to infer from this argument that the neoliberal po-
litical economy of belonging automatically excludes people
with illnesses or disabilities would be a hasty conclusion.
In September 2015, the death of a three-year-old Syrian
boy, Alan Kurdi, who drowned off the coast of Turkey dur-
ing his family’s attempt to reach Europe, sparked a massive
outcry. The picture of his dead body lying on the shore went
viral and amplified calls for more compassionate policies to-
ward Syrian refugees placing increasing pressure on govern-
ments all over the world. A few days after Alan’s death, New
Zealand decided to welcome an extra 600 Syrian refugees
in 2015/16 “and a further 500 over the next two financial
years” (New Zealand Immigration 2016). In August 2016,
the government also set aside NZ$17.2m to fund support
programs, since as a result of their “traumatic experiences
. . . many of the refugees will need counselling and support
services, [whereas] others will need help to manage a range
of disabilities and chronic health conditions” (Health Minis-
ter Jonathan Coleman, cited in Stuff 2016). This case raises
an important question: why was New Zealand reluctant to
grant residency to an autistic child but willing to welcome
and support hundreds of refugees in need of medical care?
New Zealand’s stance reflects a well-established distinc-
tion between refugees and economic migrants. Whereas the
former should be assessed and helped according to prin-
ciple of need, the latter should be evaluated solely in eco-
nomic terms. New Zealand has also a tradition of welcoming
refugees with disabilities (Saker 2010, 25–26). For instance,
in welcoming Asian refugees from Uganda in 1973, Prime
Minister Norman Kirk insisted that New Zealand should be
ready to accept “a significant proportion of ‘handicapped’
cases” (Beaglehole 2009, 107). This argument would seem-
ingly lend support to Ong’s (2016b, 22–24) view that
contemporary rationalities of inclusion and exclusion en-
compass two contending paths: neoliberalism and ethical
traditions of solidarity variously grounded in “religion . . .,
feminism, humanitarianism and other schemes of virtue.”
These traditions may challenge the economic rationality of
neoliberalism by prompting states to welcome potentially
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“defective” refugees in terms of human capital, who would
constitute a burden for the welfare state.
However, as I argued in the first section, this argument
neglects how forms of inclusion based on human rights,
shared humanity, and common solidarity may be colo-
nized and corrupted by neoliberalism. It neglects how these
values may have undergone a process of economization
and how—given that economization cannot be reduced to
monetization—entrepreneurial states may try to maximize
not just their economic growth, but their non-monetary and
non-economic value. Hence, they may evaluate prospective
citizens—a few hundred Syrian refugees, in this case—as
capital that may enhance their cultural, emotional, and rep-
utational value, even if this implies an economic cost.
This argument appears particularly relevant in the after-
math of Alan Kurdi’s death. In New Zealand, “Amnesty, the
United Nations, Catholic bishops, former Prime Minister
Helen Clark and local mayors publicly urged the Govern-
ment to do more” (Vance 2015). Yet, the rationale for “do-
ing more” was not solely framed as necessary in order to
relieve the suffering of Syrian refugees. For Labor leader
Andrew Little, “Kiwis” should keep up with their “track
record” of open borders for those in need because “[t]here
is something in our nature—we are people of conscience
and compassion—[committed] to offer help” (Vance 2015).
Similarly, for then prime minister John Key, New Zealand
should do more because “people want us to respond with
extra people, they definitely want us to respond for Syrians”
(New Zealand Herald 2015).
These remarks invite us to consider how responding to
the demand of compassion stemming from the emotional
wave provoked by Alan’s death required supplying New
Zealand with Syrian refugees in order to reproduce an eth-
ical and compassionate self-understanding of New Zealan-
ders. Alan’s death, in other words, contributed to turn Syr-
ian refugees—specifically, a few hundred Syrian refugees
with mental and physical disabilities—into a source of emo-
tional capital which would contribute to strengthening the
self-understanding of the moral value of the country.
To further explore this argument, it is necessary to con-
sider how the last few years have witnessed a progressive
shift from human rights to humanitarianism. This means
that provisions of care for “precarious lives” such as “the lives
of the unemployed and the asylum seekers, . . . of sick im-
migrants and people with AIDS, . . . of disaster victims and
victims of conflict” (Fassin 2012, 4) are increasingly linked
and subordinated to their recognition as “victims.” Abetted
by the protean development of visual culture and social me-
dia consumption, humanitarianism has introduced a new
language of compassion and emotions revolving around no-
tions of “suffering” and “trauma” that has resulted in the
construction of a “new humanity” made of individuals who
are legitimate as long as they are recognized as “suffering
bodies” (Ticktin 2011, 4–5).
Miriam Ticktin (2011, 2), for instance, explores the
French so-called “illness clause”: a humanitarian principle
that grants residence to migrants already in the country
who suffer from a life-threatening condition that would not
be properly treated in their home country. This clause en-
dows the government with the power to decide what con-
stitutes “legitimate suffering” and has contributed to turn
the “suffering body” into a “means to papers” (Ticktin 2011,
4). For Ticktin (2006, 35), this clause is the product of
and contributes to reproduce a self-understanding of France
as a “global moral leader” and as the “home of human
rights.” It has engendered “a new politics of citizenship in
France, a humanitarian space at the intersection of biopo-
litical modernity and global capital, in which contradic-
tory and unexpected diseased and disabled citizens emerge”
(Ticktin 2006, 35). Humanitarianism institutes a new global
“meritocracy of suffering” (Clifford Bob, quoted in Ticktin
2006, 34) that favors the establishment of humanitarian cor-
ridors for certain categories of refugees—such as women
and children, particularly if affected by physical and mental
conditions—and the hardening of borders for able-bodied
refugees.
Ticktin’s argument resonates with Mezzadra and Neil-
son’s notion of “differential inclusion.” This term captures
how the modern process of “disarticulation of citizenship”
results in a condition in which “inclusion in a sphere, soci-
ety, or realm can be subject to varying degrees of subordi-
nation, rule, discrimination, and segmentation” (Mezzadra
and Neilson 2013, 159). However, whereas Mezzadra and
Neilson deem differential inclusion a function of the ne-
oliberal political economy of labor—that is, of the capac-
ity of laboring bodies to be inscribed in and contribute to
neoliberal mechanisms of production, accumulation, and
dispossession—Ticktin alerts us that inclusion may also be
a function of humanitarianism. For her, humanitarianism
represents a partial degeneration (my term) of the human
rights regime since it subordinates the universalism of hu-
man rights to the more particularist and selective discourses
of emotions, charity, and compassion. Building on Tick-
tin’s argument, my contention is that humanitarianism and,
specifically, the establishment of humanitarian corridors for
vulnerable refugees are a product of a neoliberal political
economy of belonging that deems vulnerable refugees as a
source of emotional capital that can strengthen the humanity
capital of the country.
This argument is well illustrated by the United Kingdom’s
decision, shortly after the death of Alan Kurdi, to commit to
take twenty thousand Syrian refugees over a period of five
years directly from camps in Syria’s neighboring countries.
Then prime minister David Cameron (cited in BBC News
2015) explained that the refugees would be selected on the
basis of need: “We will take the most vulnerable: . . . disabled
children, . . . women who have been raped, . . . men who
have suffered torture.” Even more than in the case of New
Zealand, the British government—which had withdrawn its
support for search-and-rescue operations in the Mediter-
ranean in 2014 and refused to accept any refugees under
the European Union emergency resettlement program in
2015—came under heavy pressure to open its borders to
those in greater need.
Revealingly, the flurry of calls urging the government to
act questioned how, by failing the test of compassion, the
United Kingdom was betraying its identity, undermining its
status as a moral nation capable of abiding by its obligations,
and losing its moral value (Mavelli 2017b, 826–27). The
United Kingdom, in other words, was irredeemably dam-
aging what could be described as its humanity capital. To
avert and reverse this process, in the framework of a logic
of economization of emotions, the country decided to in-
vest in a small number of refugees who could undeniably be
recognized as “victims.” To this end, the pledge was to not
just take “womenandchildren” refugees—the embodiment
of defenseless, apolitical, and innocent victimhood as per
Cynthia Enloe’s famous definition (see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh
2017, 207). The United Kingdom raised its moral invest-
ment by committing to take the suffering (and emasculated)
bodies of disabled children, raped women, and men who
had been tortured in order to produce the emotionally valu-
able, deeply racialized, and gendered figure of the “ideal
refugee” (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2017, 209).
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The fact that this choice may be potentially costly for the
health system lends support to the argument advanced in
this article. The market value of prospective citizens may
not be reduced to their human, economic, or financial cap-
ital and to their capacity to contribute to the economic
growth of the country. The process of neoliberal economiza-
tion turns emotions into a valuable source of capital, with
the effect that inclusion may become a function of prospec-
tive citizens’ capacity to strengthen the emotional identity
and moral self-understanding of the country. From this per-
spective, the physically and mentally disabled refugees taken
by the United Kingdom and New Zealand should be con-
sidered an investment and the embodiment of an emo-
tional capital instrumental to preserving and promoting a
national sense of collective pride, self-esteem, and moral
righteousness.
This neoliberal political economy of belonging makes it
possible that, while residency to an autistic child from a rela-
tively wealthy family is denied on the grounds that he would
be a burden to taxpayers, a few hundreds or thousands of
disabled refugees are welcomed, despite their potential cost,
as a testimony of the country’s humanity. Simultaneously,
the neoliberal political economy of belonging decrees that
hundreds of thousands of refugees may languish in refugee
camps in North Africa, Turkey, and Europe, or in offshore
locations such as Christmas Island, and that hundreds may
die every day in the attempt to cross border zones such as the
United States–Mexican border or the Mediterranean. The
reason for these diverging responses is that, as Ticktin em-
phasizes, the universalism of human rights is subordinated
to the particularism of the politics of emotions.
This argument, transposed in the conceptual framework
advanced in this article, means that not all vulnerable
refugees may have sufficient emotional impact to have their
suffering turned into “humanity value” for the country. This
is the case, for instance, for the 3,000 lone child refugees
stranded in camps in Greece, Italy, and France, who were
expected to be provided safe haven in the United Kingdom
as part of the so-called “Dubs scheme” (Travis and Taylor
2017). In February 2017, with only 350 children relocated
to Britain, the government ended this scheme amid little
public protest. While a full explanation of the reasons why
this case failed to have the same emotional impact as Alan
Kurdi’s death would be beyond the scope of this article,
one of them deserves particular attention: Britain’s long-
standing “fear on numbers”—as Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher (cited in Mavelli 2017b, 825) famously stated in
1978—namely, a “raciological preoccupation” (Sparke 2006,
153) of being “swamped by people with a different culture.”
This emotional “fear on numbers” was central in the 2010
Conservative government pledge to “reduce net migration
from the hundreds of thousands to the tens of thousands”
a year (May 2010) and resulted, among other things, in:
refugee numbers being axed (among the four biggest Euro-
pean countries, the United Kingdom has the lowest number
of asylum seekers and the lowest rate of approval of asylum
claims; see Eurostat 2017); in British citizens earning less
that £18,600 being denied the possibility to bring their non-
EU spouse to the United Kingdom (as discussed in the pre-
vious section); and in “Brexit” campaigners promising that
leaving the European Union would contribute to achieving
this target.
While this promise was partially reneged after the June
2016 referendum on grounds that an abrupt reduction of
the EU migrant flow to the United Kingdom would dam-
age the economy, the Brexit referendum nonetheless con-
tributed to turn the 3 million EU citizens living in Britain
into the embodiment of conflicting forms of capital: valu-
able human capital, negative emotional capital for many
“Brexiters,” and valuable emotional capital for many “Re-
mainers.” The subsequent decision not to grant EU citizens
in the United Kingdom permanent residency ahead of the
exit negotiations with the European Union has had the ef-
fect of officially turning them, according to the HomeOffice
(cited in O’Carroll 2017), into “negotiating capital” that the
country should use to strengthen its bargaining position.
This process well illustrates the key argument I advance
in this article: the neoliberal political economy of belonging
prompts entrepreneurial states to include or exclude mi-
grants according to their endowment of human, financial,
economic, and emotional capital. While consisting of valu-
able human capital that makes “an invaluable contribution
to . . . [the British] economy and society” (UK Home Office,
cited in O’Carroll 2017), EU nationals have also become the
embodiment of an emotional capital that the Brexit referen-
dum revealed to be perceived, at least partially, in negative
terms. The possibility of belonging for EU citizens in the
United Kingdom will thus be the outcome not just of strictly
cost-benefit economic calculations and of the negotiations
but of a neoliberal economized rationality of government
that will attempt also to maximize the emotional capital of
the country, that is, its standing and self-understanding vis-
à-vis the EU.
Conclusion
Castles and Davidson (2000, viii) argue that “[p]orous
boundaries and multiple identities undermine ideas of cul-
tural belonging as a necessary accompaniment to politi-
cal membership. There are increasing numbers of citizens
who do not belong [and are perceived not to belong].”
The separation of cultural inclusion (belonging) from po-
litical inclusion (citizenship) and the progressive decline of
the former represent a threat to “the nation-state as a cen-
tral site of democracy” (Castles and Davidson 2000, viii).
The main critique advanced by the existing literature on
citizenship-by-investment programs extends this line of ar-
gument: the economic logic of the market is replacing the
political logic of citizenship by turning citizenship into a
tradable commodity. The result is a political inclusion that,
deprived of cultural belonging, is emptying citizenship from
within.
In this article, I advanced a different framework. Drawing
on a Foucauldian perspective, I conceptualized neoliberal-
ism not just and not primarily as a process of commodifi-
cation prompted by the retreat of politics and domination
of the market but as a process of economization actively
fostered by the state, which disseminates the model of the
market to all spheres of human activity. Neoliberalism turns
states and individuals into entrepreneurial subjects aimed
at maximizing their value. Building on and advancing exist-
ing research on the neoliberalization of citizenship, I argued
that this value should not be understood solely in economic
and financial terms but also in moral and emotional terms.
Challenging existing scholarship, I showed how neoliber-
alism does not simply undermine political notions of citizen-
ship grounded in reciprocity, fairness, equality, mutual par-
ticipation, and solidarity by replacing these principles with
economic ones. Rather, neoliberal economization rewrites
these principles in economic terms. The result is that neolib-
eralism does not make inclusion solely “conditional upon the
applicant’s wallet size” (Shachar and Hirschl 2014, 246; see
also Reding 2014). In the neoliberal political economy of be-
longing, states include and exclude individuals and groups
according to the latter’s endowment of human, financial,
economic, moral, and emotional capital. This argument has
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four main theoretical and political implications for the ex-
isting debate on neoliberalism and the neoliberalization of
citizenship.
First, neoliberalism absorbs, rewrites, and profanes con-
tending moral systems—such as humanitarianism—because
it “invariably exists in an essentially parasitical relationship
with those extant social formations with which it has an
antagonistic relationship” (Peck, Theodore, and Brenner
2010, 96). Hence, neoliberalism disguises its hegemony and
neutralizes the power of resistance of opposing regimes and
practices—such as humanitarian corridors—by co-opting
them. This means that neoliberal rationalities operate at
a much more concealed level than that represented by
the possibility for the ultra-rich to buy citizenship or resi-
dency. Future research on the neoliberalization of citizen-
ship needs to account for the fact that neoliberalism as a
transformation of subjectivities and political rationalities is
not happening in plain sight, but, as a Wendy Brown (2015)
perceptively observes, as a “stealth revolution.”
Second, neoliberalism’s “stealth revolution” encompasses
and thrives on a distinctive emotional logic. This logic tran-
scends mere cost-benefit calculations. It prompts states to
strive to maximize their capital value even in those moral,
emotional, and reputational domains where money may not
be directly at stake or even if this may imply an economic
cost. This means that neoliberal rationalities, and therefore
neoliberal citizenship, cannot be reduced to mere dynam-
ics of profit and commodification. Neoliberal citizenship is
the product of a more complex and protean matrix of
accumulation that frames individuals and groups as the
embodiment of different forms of capital value. In this
matrix, the suffering and victimization of particularly vul-
nerable refugees may be as valuable as the material wealth
of ultra high-net-worth individuals who buy their way into
the country. Hence, neoliberalism establishes a regime of
differences—between included and excluded, worthy and
unworthy, and valuable and less valuable—through a logic
of equivalence that reduces every human to some form and
amount of capital. Future research needs to further investi-
gate the role that racial and gender stereotypes play in the
establishment of this logic of equivalence and in the per-
ception and construction of certain migrants as a valuable
source of emotional capital.
Third, the neoliberal logic of equivalence is not only fos-
tering a process of “disarticulation of citizenship,” which, as
Mezzadra and Neilson (2013, 159) observe, subordinates in-
clusion “to varying degrees of subordination, rule, discrim-
ination, and segmentation.” It is prompting the very over-
coming of citizenship by making the traditional rights of
protection and mobility associated with this institution no
longer a function of birth, residency, and family ties but
of an individual’s or group’s endowment of different forms
of capital. The term “neoliberal citizenship” may thus well
be an oxymoron. Citizenship designates a protected status
that has been increasingly questioned by neoliberal ratio-
nalities. The inherent contradiction in the notion of neolib-
eral citizenship reveals a fundamental feature of neoliberal-
ism: neoliberalism cannot coexist with contending schemes
of value, as it has a remarkable capacity to capture and incor-
porate them. Neoliberalism, differently said, has no outside.
Fourth, this argument does not suggest that resistance to
neoliberalism is impossible or futile. It suggests that resis-
tance needs to begin from the recognition that neoliberal-
ism is not one voice among many but the overarching gram-
mar that governs structures of consciousness and regimes of
practices in existing debates on citizenship, inclusion, and
belonging. Hence, I conclude, resistance to the neoliberal
political economy of belonging cannot start from the search
for alternative “schemes of virtue” (Ong 2006b, 22) but from
an investigation of how seemingly contending rationalities
have been infiltrated, colonized, and distorted by neolib-
eral logics. It requires bringing to the surface the internal
alienation of existing practices of inclusion and exclusion,
revealing their contradictory and unifying logics, and expos-
ing their inner hypocrisies by interrogating how states have
been actively promoting and cultivating neoliberal forms of
belonging.
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